Carbon pricing has been the most prominent climate change mitigation policy for the EU since the launch of its emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005. Since then, the context of international climate policy as well as of the socio-political and economical context of decarbonisation has changed considerably. The 2015 Paris Agreement engages virtually every country unlike its predecessor, while non-carbon pricing policies have led to rapid cost reductions in renewables, even if other sectors (particularly in energy-intensive industry) have not seen similar developments. This paper examines how the role of carbon pricing in the EU climate policy mix has evolved from its beginnings as a means to help achieve modest targets under the Kyoto Protocol, to a policy instrument increasingly augmented by a wider policy mix aimed at reaching no net emissions of greenhouse gases by mid-century.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has been a frontrunner in the use of carbon pricing as a climate change mitigation policy instrument to promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Its emissions trading system (EU ETS) was established in 2003 and entered into force in 2005, at a time when global climate policy was still dominated by the Kyoto Protocol. A decade and a half later, much has changed, not only in global climate policy but also in the design and operation of the EU's carbon market. Indeed, the appraisal and expectations of what role a carbon pricing instrument can fulfil in a climate policy mix has shifted significantly, reflecting in part the stringent demands of long-term climate targets that aim at 'net-zero' greenhouse gas emissions, where any remaining emissions need to be balanced by negative emissions (i.e. the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere). Achieving such ambitious targets requires transformational change across the economy, and specifically so in the power, industry, transport, buildings (energy use), agriculture and waste sectors responsible for greenhouse gas emissions.
The need for transformational change was reinforced by the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 (UNFCC, 2015) -which aims to limit the global temperature increase to "well below 2C" and "pursue efforts [for] 1.5C" -as well as by the IPCC (2015) Special Report on this 1.5C target. While the governance structure of the Paris Agreement inherently allows all countries to set their own national climate objectives ("nationally determined contributions"), 1 the EU aims to be a frontrunner in climate mitigation policy and as such is discussing adopting "climate-neutrality" (i.e. net-zero greenhouse gas emissions) objectives (European Council, 2019) . In November 2018, the European Commission released a new long-term strategy that assesses how the EU can move towards climate-neutrality (European Commission, 2018) .
While the European Commission 2 and European Parliament (2019) already support the aim of climateneutrality by 2050, the actual adoption of a climateneutrality/net-zero greenhouse gas emissions target requires the member states of the EU to agree on it by consensus in the European Council, which they have yet to do. The new European Commission proposes a 'Green New Deal' as a political banner under which to propose various climate and energy measures that together structure the socio-economic transition to a climate-neutral economy (von der Leyen, 2019) . This includes intermediate targets for 2030 and amendments to the existing policy mix. The proposed target for 2030 -which also requires consensus in the European Council -is for a 55 per cent (ibid, p.6) (and "at least 50 per cent") reduction in emissions, up from "at least 40 per cent" reduction agreed in October 2014 (European Council, 2014) .
The new European Commission also proposes specific policy measures that would have an impact on the role of carbon pricing in the EU climate policy mix. First, it proposes the introduction of a 'carbon border tax'. This is not the first time the more general idea of 'border carbon adjustments' has been brought up in EU climate policy (Gros et al., 2010) , as various safeguards to the competitiveness of domestic trade-exposed and energyintensive industry are a constant priority for European policymakers. It is, however, novel that the idea is (re) introduced as part of a signature policy package by an incoming administration. Border measures such as the proposed tax (although it has only been proposed so far as a concept, not in detail) could amount to a de facto extension of the EU's carbon pricing system to selected imports and therefore also impact trade policy.
Besides this international extension of the EU carbon market, the new European Commission also proposes a domestic extension of the system to sectors currently not included: maritime emissions, transport and energy-use in buildings. The inclusion of maritime emissions is less controversial, as due to its global structure it has generally avoided binding emissions reduction obligations so far, 3 unlike the aviation sector, which has been included in the emissions trading system since 2012. 4 Extending the system to (road) transport, however, is more fraught with controversy even if there are examples of other jurisdictions (such as California: see C2ES, 2019) that have successfully included it in carbon market mechanisms. Energy-use from buildings has been left out of carbon markets for similar reasons: the emissions in these sectors tend to be dispersed, small in volume at end-use point sources and, most importantly, consumer and/or taxpayer facing. In lieu of carbon pricing, these sectors often have been subject to command and control policies, 5 or indeed been left off the hook entirely.
Under these proposals, the relative importance of carbon pricing in the EU climate policy mix seems again set to change. This paper aims to give an overview of the changing role of carbon pricing in the EU, since the launch of the EU ETS in 2005 and the lessons for other jurisdictions building climate policy portfolios aimed at deep emissions cuts across the economy. Section 2 describes market failures and political economy challenges pertaining to carbon pricing mechanisms. Section 3 discusses briefly some specific challenges of 'deep decarbonisation' 6 and the role of a carbon pricing mechanism in these challenges. Section 4 gives an overview of the development of the EU ETS from its beginnings to throughout the crisis and reform years of the 2010s. Section 5 discusses the role of the EU ETS in the more demanding climate policy environment of the 'post-Paris' era. The final section offers some conclusions.
Market imperfections and political economy
In creating a regulatory market through political intervention, carbon pricing in general and emissions trading in particular are based on a presumption of the economic efficiency of markets. In the EU ETS this is evident in the rationale of the policy, but 'cap-and-trade' systems (Hahn and Stavins, 2011) more generally are influenced by the Coase Theorem that states that an optimal allocation of resources can be attained by freely bargaining parties if property rights are well-defined and transaction costs sufficiently low. 7
However, carbon markets, as well as the economy more broadly, affected by these and other climate policies, face a myriad of market imperfections or failures that can undermine the efficiency of the price mechanism. In addition, political economy considerations also play a major role in the efficacy and efficiency of climate policies.
Market imperfections
The first market imperfection is economies of scale in the production of carbon-neutral products that have been or are yet to be developed. High initial capital expenditures can be a barrier to entry for manufacturers of low-carbon products. Cost reductions that may be realised through learning effects with higher scale would benefit all producers. Since a carbon price tends to start relatively low and increase over time -either because of a politically determined pathway or because of increased scarcity in cap-and-trade systems -carbon prices may initially not be sufficiently high to trigger investment in more expensive low-carbon technology. 8
Principal-agent problems may arise in cases where carbon pricing systems are applied to consumer facing sectors, such the transport and buildings sectors, as currently proposed by Ursula von der Leyen (see Ryan et al., 2011) . Such issues can arise when the carbon price would apply to an agent that is not able to enact measures to reduce emissions. For example, people living in rented apartments may not be able to affect the emissions generated in heating their buildings as they have only limited influence on decisions about improving insulation. Likewise, for road transport, while carbon pricing applied to fuels may influence some consumption on the margin it does not directly lead to more efficient vehicles or vehicles with a different drivetrain.
Carbon markets are also incomplete markets. Even within the EU, the EU ETS only covers about 45 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions (European Commission, 2019) and only 20 per cent of global GHG emissions are covered by any carbon pricing mechanism (World Bank Group, 2019). The incomplete global markets give rise to concerns both about competitiveness and carbon leakage, which has resulted in complex allocation schemes to mitigate this risk.
Network effects further affect deep decarbonisation efforts. Current energy infrastructure needs investment (electricity grids -to deal with high shares of variable generation capacity) or may become stranded assets (natural gas) while future carbon-neutral energy infrastructure (e.g. for hydrogen and carbon capture and storage) needs to be deployed over time or, alternatively, existing pipeline infrastructure upgraded. Specific market concerns that may arise include uncertainty about volumes and concerns about monopoly power in the operation of this infrastructure (Elkerbout and Bryhn, 2019) . The contribution of a (potentially volatile, in the case of emissions trading) carbon price signal to the business case on either the operation or investment side is uncertain.
A more general externality arises with the vast amount of innovation, including later stages (e.g. the 'valley of death': see Grubb, 2004) that is required to reach net-zero targets. With all companies within a sector potentially being able to benefit from low-carbon innovation, there is an incentive to underinvest (i.e. innovation as a public good). This opens the door to public policies aimed at spurring more targeted innovation in low-carbon technology. 9
Political economy
With regard to political economy, three issues stand out. The first are collective action problems as described by Olson (1971) . Many of the industries directly addressed by carbon pricing policies represent concentrated interests versus the more diffuse interests of the global population who stand to benefit from climate mitigation policies. The former face fewer transaction costs and coordination difficulties in organising to represent their interests. The design of emissions trading systems is particularly amenable to lobbying moreover, due to its complicated allocation system that involves the transfer of property rights. Indeed, industries have been successful in extending the system of free allocation, that was intended to be limited. 10 A second political economy challenge is that of credible commitment (Brunner et al., 2012) . If faced with a choice between revoking the licence of operators or inflating the cap in the EU ETS, will politicians always opt for the former? Concerns about this credible commitment help explain why some policymakers and stakeholders also care about emissions reductions and/or carbon prices on shorter time horizons, even if, in principle, the cap ensures that the environmental objective is met.
The third issue combines these two political economy challenges. Any carbon pricing mechanism concentrates the costs of climate policy 11 on a select number of industries that represent concentrated interests able to mobilise effectively to influence the policy. Meanwhile, the benefits are diffuse and dispersed in the general economy and population. Other climate policies may invert this logic. For example, renewable energy support policies can helpfully create a small constituency greatly benefitting from the policy (the renewable energy developers) while diffusing the costs of the policy (e.g. subsidies) among the general population. This may make it easier to generate political support for commitments to the latter kind of policy, in comparison to strengthening carbon pricing mechanisms, and therefore can also help explain policy mixes that combine these different approaches (Jenkins, 2014) .
Challenges of deep decarbonisation and 'climate-neutrality'
In the European context of reaching climate neutrality, the required deep decarbonisation efforts bring along a number of challenges that need to be addressed in a policy mix. In some cases, a carbon price signal can help address such challenges, in other cases it cannot, and other measures are required.
The first challenge arises because electrification will play a major role in sectors currently not relying predominantly on electricity. Electrification can be direct or indirect, with the latter involving the use of electrolysis to create green hydrogen. Sectors where direct and indirect electrification will play a role include energy-intensive industry, e.g. increased use of electric arc furnaces in the steel sector or hydrogen use to deliver high-temperature heat. Wholesale electricity prices may be pushed down at times when the share of zero marginal cost but variable renewables (wind and solar) in electricity generation is high, thereby undercutting revenues for electricity generators. This is a function of the electricity market design based on marginal pricing. Low electricity prices may be good for sectors consuming (by increasing amounts) electricity but are bad for utilities which need large-scale investment in additional carbon-neutral electricity generation. 12 The impact of a carbon price for the electricity sector is that it can push up wholesale prices even as the share of renewables in the system is increasing (and its carbon intensity decreasing), which may help the generators but could create problems for large individual consumers of electricity, especially in industry. 13 Electricity should be affordable to sectors using it to reduce emissions but equally still yield sufficient returns to enable increased capital investment by the power sector. Carbon pricing and electricity market design policies therefore interact in pursuing electrification as a decarbonisation strategy.
A second challenge, specific to material producers in energy-intensive industry, is that while the ETS price may result in a significant price increase for primary basic materials such as steel, cement or aluminium, the price increase of the final goods in which these materials would be used is modest, or even negligible as the main cost component of final goods (e.g. cars or buildings)is not the materials (Rootzén and Johnsson, 2016, 2017) . It is also an example of a principal-agent problem; demand for materials may be elastic for those procuring materials but inelastic when passed through to final goods. While even higher carbon prices could eventually make a greater difference in final goods prices, this raises concerns about the political feasibility of higher carbon prices especially for sectors at risk of carbon leakage. Even so, it shows that carbon prices need not necessarily translate to higher prices for consumers. This shows the importance of a value chain perspective in assessing the distributional implications of a climate policy mix (Rootzén and Johnsson, 2018) .
A third challenge is the demand reduction spurred by circular economy policies in basic material sectors. While higher material efficiency may in itself be a driver of emissions reductions (Material Economics, 2018) it can also lead to excess production capacity in industry. For example, more recycling of steel reduces the demand for primary steel production (a different industrial process performed by different production facilities than for secondary steel) but is unlikely to wholly eliminate the need for primary steel. This may undercut the incentives for businesses to invest in new, carbon-neutral production capacity. Therefore, for jurisdictions that pursue ambitious circular economy policies such as the EU, a carbon price signal that succeeds in pushing out of the market older and less efficient industrial production capacity gains importance.
A final challenge is that, as carbon pricing instruments affect an increasing number of sectors to greater extents, the interactions between sectors become more complicated. This can be the result of sector coupling and sector integration or because some products are substituted for others to which a different climate policy regime applies (e.g. ETS versus non-ETS sectors). 14 There is a similar international dimension as countries outside the EU start to adopt more ambitious climate policies, some of which may involve emissions trading systems (ICAP, 2019) . With policies both domestically and abroad interacting, issues of competitiveness may further rise in salience with policy fields such as competition policy, subsidy control (or state aid policy in the EU) and industrial policy also playing a role in climate policy. Policies mitigating carbon leakage risk should reflect the ambition level of trade partners' climate policies to be effective and proportional; however, ensuring this increases the complexity of the policy design as it requires data and assessment regarding non-EU climate policies.
Where did we come from? 4.1 The beginnings of carbon pricing in the EU
The defining characteristic of the EU agreeing in 2003 to launch an emissions trading system is that it was a second preference for some of its legislators (member states in the Council of Ministers and members of the European Parliament). The European Commission (1992) had already initiated a proposal for a carbon tax in 1992. However, the introduction of EU-wide taxes requires unanimity in the Council of Ministers as the fiscal competency remains with member states. The EU thereby became the first major economic bloc making a decisive choice in the perennial debate among environmental economists of whether to choose a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system as the most efficient way of pricing carbon (Weitzman, 1974) : or in other words, 'prices or quantities?' (Stiglitz, 2019) . As the decision-making processes of the EU did not encourage agreement on a carbon tax level and pathway between the then fifteen member states, regulating quantities won out.
The international context of climate policy was markedly different in 2003 compared to today. Even if the Kyoto Protocol had been delivered a blow by the refusal of the US to ratify the agreement, the EU was intent on implementing its commitments. Two elements stand out in explaining the dominance of carbon pricing in EU climate policy discourse: the first is the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol, which enabled some exchange of emissions units between parties to the agreement (i.e. countries) for compliance and therefore was amenable to emissions trading at lower levels as well. The second element is the more modest emissions reduction targets that were required to be met, especially in the short term, compared to the long-term pathways set in the wake of the Paris Agreement. Lower emissions reduction targets can be met through many different means compared to deeper emissions reduction scenarios that require all sectors, and all countries, to maximise their abatement efforts. These two elements are examined more in detail.
Under the top-down architecture of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC, 1988 ) a number of mechanisms were created that facilitated a global market for emissions, with units representing greenhouse gases being the traded commodity. Parties with commitments under 'Kyoto' had their targets expressed as levels of allowed emissions which were subsequently turned into Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). 15 The AAUs -each representing a tonne of CO 2 -equivalent -could then be traded between Parties to satisfy compliance under the Kyoto commitment periods. Two further mechanisms enabled the creation of units linked to actual emissions reduction efforts that could be used for compliance under the Kyoto Protocol: Joint Implementation projects and the Clean Development Mechanism. Both are examples of baseline-and-credit systems, which allow emissions trading to be extended to jurisdictions that have not capped emissions themselves. Joint Implementation allows this to be done between two Parties with commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, while the Clean Development Mechanism allows units to be generated in developing countries without their own commitment obligations for compliance use in (developed) countries with Kyoto commitments. The combination of these mechanisms in principle allowed a global carbon market to develop, either through direct trade of the units created by the mechanisms, or by creating own emissions trading systems (which could potentially be linked to other systems) and settling the accounts for compliance with AAUs.
In the EU, its emissions trading system was indeed designed keeping in mind the architecture of the Kyoto Protocol and its mechanisms. While the first trading phase from 2005 to 2007 was still intended as a pilot and learning phase, the second trading phase from 2008 to 2012 tracked the Kyoto compliance phase with emissions capped at the level of the EU's commitment (8 per cent emissions reduction compared to 1990, exceeding the 5 per cent target mandated by the Kyoto Protocol). The EU also allowed Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) and Emission Reduction Units (ERU) from the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation respectively to be used for compliance, subject to some quantitative restrictions. 16 The idea of trading between parties was expressed even more by translating the common EU Kyoto target to individual member state targets and, more importantly, by allowing each member state to be in charge of the allocation in their respective countries through national allocation plans. In essence, therefore, the EU ETS during its second phase was itself a linked carbon market comprising the by then 27 member states of the EU in 2008 as well as the three members of the European Economic Area. This decentralised structure created a virtually 'fractal' system of emission trading entities, where carbon could be traded between individual operators and citizens (everyone can open an ETS trading account) right up to countries for compliance reasons under the Kyoto Protocol.
The emissions reduction targets that had to be met in this phase, however, were a long way off from the 'net-zero' targets that are on the table today. For 2020, the EU target is to reduce its emissions by 20 per cent overall compared to 1990, 17 and by 24 per cent in the ETS sectors specifically. Longer term, the emissions pathways did not yet end up in net-zero, but rather foresaw a global reduction of 50-70 per cent of GHG emissions (European Commission, 2004) . This left significant residuals of emissions implying that some sectors (or countries) could continue to emit greenhouse gases indefinitely. Such sectors would therefore continue to create a natural demand for certificates or other units representing emission rights. A downside to emissions trading in long-term decarbonisation scenarios where emission caps reach zero is that eventually the demand should likewise drop to zero, and the property rights at that point lose their value. Before this point is reached, carbon markets with only narrow scopes (i.e. small in terms of absolute emissions covered) may become volatile as decisions regarding individual emitting sites can affect a relatively high share of emissions.
In the short term, conversely, many different sectors may have incremental ways of reducing emissions by small amounts without requiring radical investment or transformation of production processes. In addition, it remains an option to reduce output and sell excess emission rights to other sectors, if they are valuable enough.
These factors make emissions trading an attractive policy to meet, with certainty, modest emissions reduction targets. To reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions targets requires more transformational changes in many sectors, to replace fossil fuel-based processes with carbon-neutral ones. But in the early years of the EU ETS, such targets were still a long way off. In those circumstances a climate policy strategy leaning heavily on carbon pricing may seem appropriate. Even so, at that time the EU had already adopted a policy mix with separate targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency -the so-called 20-20-20 targets -aimed at incentivising specific solutions.
The EU ETS during the 'polycrisis' period
The EU's approach to carbon pricing would face its first serious test shortly after the start of the second ETS trading period . While carbon prices initially continued to rise, reaching up to about €30 by the middle of the year, the turmoil in financial markets would soon reverberate through the carbon markets. By the start of 2009, the EU's carbon price had crashed to below €10 (see figure 1) .
Several elements in the design of the European carbon market exacerbated the impact of the economic crisis. The first was the decentralised allocation system through the national allocation plans. The overall EU cap for this period consisted of the sum of the national allocation plans. 18 Unlike from 2013 onwards, only a small percentage of allowances were auctioned, with around 90 per cent given away for free 19 (see figure  2 ). With member states having some discretion in how many allowances to allocate, there was an incentive for member states to be overly generous with allowance allocation for fears that not doing so would put their own industries at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis those in other countries. The concerns over safeguarding competitiveness remain a dominant feature of any reform discussion of the EU ETS. This propensity to over-allocate was a first contributor to the supplydemand imbalances that started to accumulate during the second trading phase.
The second contributor to the allowance surplus was that free allocation volumes were based on historical production levels, with the base years preceding the economic crisis that hit after 2008. As industrial output levels declined from 2009 onwards, allocation volumes remained unchanged, thereby widening the supplydemand imbalances in the EU carbon market.
A third factor was allowing the use of international credits from the Kyoto mechanisms for compliance purposes under the EU ETS. With the national allocation plans and rigid free allocation based on outdated production levels already creating imbalances, allowing the import of an external source of supply -essentially expanding the cap -would only exacerbate this.
International context
As the global economy worsened, the context of international climate policy was likewise undergoing changes. At the end of 2009, at COP19 in Copenhagen, the Parties to the UNFCCC attempted to come up with a successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol that had failed to gain traction following the non-ratification of the US. The aim of the conference was to adopt a binding treaty that would commit all industrialised countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Although the conference did result in a (hard-fought) agreement text, 'Copenhagen' is still widely considered a failure as the agreement did not set legally binding emission reduction objectives. It was therefore, in a way, the final attempt at topdown climate governance, later to be superseded by the Paris Agreement's bottom-up governance of voluntary nationally determined contributions combined with a binding process for reviewing and revising these pledges.
The EU did not want to be deterred by the absence of an (ambitious) international agreement and continued with its domestic climate policy agenda, even if the topic of international competitiveness and carbon leakage risk 20 would play a more central role. In 2011, the European Commission released its "2050 roadmap for a low-carbon economy". In it, the Commission set out a pathway for the EU to reduce its emissions by 80-95 per cent by 2050. The upper end in particular represents a more radical objective, as it entails the elimination of the vast majority of emissions, with just a small residual remaining.
A period of reforms in the 2010s
For the third trading phase starting in 2013, the EU made a number of significant changes to the design of its emissions trading system. Besides a number of industrial sectors (e.g. aluminium) being added to the system, arguably the biggest change was that auctioning would in principle be the default method of allocation. 21 In the European power sector, utilities that had received allowances for free were able to pass the carbon price on to consumers, thereby generating windfall profits (Sijm et al., 2006 ) -auctioning would correct this. Nevertheless, for industrial sectors considered at significant risk 22 of carbon leakage, free allocation based on efficiency benchmarks would still be available. This resulted in nearly 97 per cent of industrial emissions still being covered by free allocation.
Another change was that the national allocation plans were dismissed in favour of an EU-wide cap. Moreover, this centralised cap would be reduced by a fixed quantity every year through a so-called linear reduction factor. This annual cap reduction amounts to 38 million tonnes for the years 2013 to 2020 and is calibrated with the ETS sector contributions 23 to the EU's target of reducing emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 (see figure 3 ).
Even with this revised design, the surplus (around 2 billion, roughly one year of ETS emissions) that had built up over the second trading phase presented a 'hangover' for the system at the start of the third phase. Allowance prices had further declined to less than €5, and the supply-demand imbalances were not fully addressed in the new design, even if the use of international credits had been curtailed. 24 The low carbon price stressed the credibility of the EU ETS, and due to its framing as the cornerstone of EU climate policy, that of EU climate leadership in general. Between 2012 and 2015, a number of further reforms to the ETS were proposed, with the primary aim to tackle the accumulated supply-demand imbalances.
In the context of these reforms, a number of questions implicitly needed to be addressed by policymakers that give additional insight into the role of carbon pricing in the EU (see also Elkerbout, 2019) . All issues relate to different extents to the credibility of the emissions trading system both as a market and an effective climate policy instrument:
• Can the legislator (i.e. creator) and regulator of a carbon market be the same entity as the supply-side of the market?
• Are the low carbon prices that the system generated a problem, or are they rather the point?
• How fixed, and therefore credible, is the cap really?
The question of the legislator and regulator versus the supply-side of the market was implicitly raised by the proposed solution to the ongoing imbalances. The EU, through legislation, withheld a certain quantity of allowances from the auction schedule during 2013 and 2014 (to reintroduce them later in 2019 and 2020; socalled Backloading). 25 In 2015, such an approach was institutionalised through the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), 26 which removes allowances from the auction schedule to place them in a reserve based on pre-determined parameters related to the total number of allowances in circulation. For some stakeholders this amounted to unjustified political intervention in the market. 27 In this view, the only job of the regulator is to set the long-term cap and a schedule for allocation allowances and then leave the market to it. However, the idea of 'political intervention' in a market that in its very core is of a political and regulatory nature is counterintuitive. The tradeable property rights that enable emissions trading only exist through legislative fiat. Moreover, any market needs a supply side. Having a wholly inelastic supply is not necessarily part of a 'natural' or normal market.
The controversy about whether and how to intervene in the supply of the market should also be considered in conjunction with the question of whether low carbon prices are a problem; i.e. the second question listed above. For the European Commission, the EU ETS is first and foremost a quantity-based mechanism (Delbeke, 2016) . As such, the justification for the Backloading and MSR reforms was always the structural imbalance that had accumulated, not the low carbon prices observed in the system. Other stakeholders (e.g. environmental NGOs) argued that low prices in the ETS showed that the system was ineffective at promoting emissions reductions. After all, at €5 per tonne, the incentive to reduce emissions is weak as many abatement options carry higher costsincluding prominent options in the electricity sector, such as deploying renewables or substituting coal with natural gas. Nevertheless, from a purely theoretical perspective, low carbon prices should not be a problem and could even be seen as desirable as a given environmental objective would be reached at lower cost. For this to hold in practice, however, two related things need to be true as well. The first is that the cap needs to be absolutely credible. If indeed a cap is irrevocably binding, then at some point when the cap reaches its final goal (under current legislation, zero by 2058), 28 businesses that continue to emit greenhouse gases would lose their societal licence to operate as there would be no way to fulfil the compliance obligation under the EU ETS. In such a scenario carbon prices could rapidly increase as scarcity in the system increases, thereby still triggering sufficient abatementeven if only towards the end of the compliance period.
An alternative course of action that could transpire, however, is that when faced with a situation where domestic industries face very high carbon prices or the prospect of having their licence to operate revoked, the legislator decides to expand the cap to prevent the economic (and political) costs of potentially many industries having to shut down production to meet the environmental objective. Therefore, the fact that a cap set through legislation can later be inflated through legislation creates a problem of credible commitment.
The second issue is that of dynamic efficiency (Fuss et al., 2018) . Many sectors, particularly in energy-intensive industries, require carbon-neutral technologies that are not yet commercially available at scale, and which require transformational changes to production processes and other parts of future carbon-neutral value chains. Examples include carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology applied to industrial processes with its associated transport and storage infrastructure or hydrogen-based industrial processes to deliver industrial heat. This also requires a carbon-neutral hydrogen production supply chain based on either electrolysis and renewable electricity or natural gas with CCS. Implementing such technologies comes with long lead times. By only relying on a carbon price signal, requisite investments may not be made in time. There is also the issue of time horizons. If businesses are myopic (Flachsland et al., 2019) with regard to their investment decisions, even a cap that with certainty will reach zero, like in the EU ETS, may not be sufficient to trigger investments. In fact, the prospect that the efficiency of the EU ETS could be improved by intertemporal optimisation has been suggested as one of the main benefits of the Market Stability Reserve (Fuss et al., 2018) . By adjusting the auction supply and stabilising the supply-demand balance in the system, the price path in the EU ETS could also become more stable, thereby supporting investments that depend on a predictable carbon price for positive returns.
An equally fundamental issue is under what conditions businesses would invest anyway in transformational climate-neutral products and production processes. This question is examined in the next section and gives insight into how the EU climate policy mix could evolve in response to ambitious targets such as the European Commission's proposed climate-neutrality target for 2050, and what the role of carbon pricing is in achieving this objective.
A climate policy mix for transformational change
Even if the EU ETS has widely been considered the central policy of the EU climate policy mix, multiple policies targeting some -but not all -ETS sectors have always been the norm. Hence, the separate targets for renewables and energy efficiency that were agreed for 2020 and strengthened twice (first by consensus in the European Council of October 2014 and again during the legislative process for the "clean energy package" in 2018) for 2030.
In the debates on reforming the EU ETS these separate policy targets have always been controversial, with some referring to the targets as "overlapping policies". This term implies that having separate targets for renewables and energy efficiency is superfluous if the power sector is already subject to a carbon pricing mechanism. Separate targets would pre-empt emissions reduction efforts by directing the economy towards specific abatement options, rather than letting the carbon price signal drive the most economically efficient abatement. However, this view is challenged by the argument that the policies do not have the same objectives at all, and therefore do not overlap, but only interact. According to Burtraw et al. (2018) , 'companion policies' is a more accurate term therefore for additional renewable and energy efficiency objectives. Indeed, the stated objective of the renewables directive and energy efficiency directive is to promote the share of renewable energy 29 and to increase energy efficiency, 30 not to promote the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as with the EU ETS. 31 Even if the need to mitigate climate change and reduce emissions is the reason for wanting more renewables and energy efficiency this does not render the individual policy objectives the same. 32 The separate targets, moreover, address some of the innovation and scale externalities by creating a market for renewables leading to lower costs, which in turn increase the potency of the carbon price to drive further emissions reductions. By regulating for energy efficiency, principal-agent problems can be overcome.
Renewables and energy efficiency targets primarily target the power sector. For the industrial sectors included in the EU ETS, such additional policies are absent so far. The experience of the power sector can nevertheless be instructive in reviewing what role carbon pricing can play in a broader climate policy mix. Whereas the legally defined role of the EU ETS is that of "promoting emissions reductions" 33 this need not necessarily be synonymous with an increase in low-carbon technology, energy or production. It is entirely possible to reduce emissions simply by reducing the output of the most carbon-intensive assets. A carbon price signal, in other words, can primarily be seen as a disincentive for carbon-intensive production, one that 'pushes' out of the market the most polluting forms of production. However, for a transformation to climate neutrality, other measures are necessary to 'pull' low-carbon energy and production methods into the market. For the power sector, the 'overlapping' policies fulfilled this role by setting hard targets. Creating demand for renewables and thus increasing the market for them has supported cost reductions in the technology. This interacts positively with the push effect of the carbon price, as a lower carbon price can then trigger substitution 34 from carbon-intensive to lower carbon production. 35 Industries themselves will only invest in transformational low-carbon technologies if there is a reasonable prospect of a profitable market. This links the investment question to the competitiveness-carbon leakage risk quandary. If climate-neutral products are not (yet) cost-competitive with conventional alternatives, investment may be deterred. Carbon leakage risk, even if not leading to displaced emissions, can thus still be detrimental to a climate-neutral transition if requisite investments (with long lead times) are not made. Therefore, additional policies to spur low-carbon technology development and scale can complement carbon pricing (Elkerbout, 2017) . At the same time, the carbon price can be effective at deterring investment into carbon-intensive assets.
Increasing the scale of low-carbon technologies needs to happen across numerous energy-intensive industries. While five large emitters are responsible for 75 per cent of industrial ETS emissions, 36 the hundred-plus sectors making up the other quarter will also need low-carbon technology and investment in its deployment at scale. 37 While the ETS price signal fulfils the 'push' mechanism, the 'pull' counterparts for industry have not been present to the same extent as for the power sector. While some dedicated funds have been set up to support innovation projects (i.e. demonstration) with the ETS innovation fund, the scale of this fund is limited to the sale of 450 million ETS allowances over a 10-year period. 38 By infrastructure or other investment into low-carbon infrastructure such as CCS. 40 Many of these policies will directly or indirectly affect the demand for ETS allowances. The role of the EU ETS in such a broad policy mix can also be seen as supporting (through the push effect of the carbon price) and managing the interactions between these numerous climate policies.
The stability inducing effect of the Market Stability Reserve -by adjusting the auction supply in response to increases of the total number of allowances in circulation, irrespective of what caused this -plays an important role in maintaining the effectiveness and relevance of the system. The possibility of automatic invalidation of allowances in the MSR, furthermore, enables gradual strengthening of the cap.
The proposals by Mrs von der Leyen to extend the system to the transport and buildings sectors would bring a larger share of EU emissions under a single cap. Nevertheless, expansion to consumer-facing sectors with high cost and non-cost barriers to reduce emissions remains controversial. Pull measures such as vehicle standards and energy efficiency standards can still be expected to play an important role in forcing emissions reductions in the individual sectors. To the extent that emissions reductions are not realised, however, the increased demand for allowances will strengthen the push effect wherever carbon-intensive production can be disincentivised.
Conclusion
The EU ETS to date is still the largest cap-and-trade system in the world and one of the foremost examples of using carbon pricing as a cornerstone of climate change mitigation policy. In its fifteen years of operation it has undergone significant changes along with changes in the larger political and economic environment of climate policy. Beyond fulfilling a role as a push mechanism, the EU ETS as a cap-and-trade system has the benefit of bringing multiple sectors of the economy under a single cap. Even if the cap can be adjusted again through the political process, a single cap provides a unified direction that can be easily aligned with long-term emissions reduction goals. Unlike with a carbon tax, in a scenario where the emissions target risks being missed, the mounting scarcity of allowances will result in upward pressure on carbon prices and therefore on the incentive to abate.
Nevertheless, even with the ETS as a push mechanism and a cap in place, the overall role of the EU ETS in reaching a climate-neutral economy by 2050 will be just one of many instruments in addition to, for example, renewables support, innovation funding, a taxonomy for 'green finance', public procurement standards, contracts for differences, and 'greening' the financing activities of the European Investment Bank (OECD, 2015) . Furthermore, many national policies will have an impact on the success and speed of emissions reductions, be they coalphase dates, electric vehicle subsidies, electric charging While an extended policy mix may be seen as diminishing the relative importance of carbon pricing, the (multiple times) reformed EU ETS will continue to play a crucial role serving as a push mechanism for carbon-intensive assets. At the same time, additional policies such as standards and market-making industrial policy instruments will play an increasingly important role as pull mechanisms to usher in more rapid substitution of the capital stock towards climate-neutral assets. Beyond the price signal, additional benefits of the EU ETS are the cap and its relatively technology-neutral design. The proposals of Ursula von der Leyen indicate an interest in having the EU ETS play a dominant role in future EU climate policy, by expanding its scope, and by potentially introducing a carbon border tax as a more structural means of addressing carbon leakage risk. The iterative Paris Agreement governance and developments in the cost and availability of low-carbon technology, however, will likely mean that recalibration of the EU climate policy mix will remain an ongoing process with the member states in the Council and the European Parliament having the final say.
NOTES
1 Paris Agreement Articles 3 and 4.
2 See e.g. DG CLIMA on the "2050 Long-term Strategy": https:// ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en. 3 The International Maritime Body (IMO) has so far failed to agree on global market-based measures. See: http://www.imo.org/en/ OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/ Market-Based-Measures.aspx. 4 The international aviation body ICAO's own market-based mechanism (CORSIA) will also affect EU aviation. 5 Such as through EU vehicle standards for CO 2 as established by Regulation (EU) No 333/2014. 6 'Deep decarbonisation' is sometimes considered a contentious term as the goal of climate policy is to reduce carbon dioxide (and other greenhouse gases) emissions, not to remove 'carbon' per se from economic activity. It is used in this paper as a shorthand for steps to reduce GHG emissions in line with long-term climate targets that aim for net-zero GHG emissions such as the European Commission's climate-neutrality objective. See also Jeffrey Sachs (2015), who defines deep decarbonisation as "initial steps that prepare the way for much deeper steps [in emissions reductions] after that". 7 Ronald Coase himself did not formulate this theorem and indeed emphasised strongly in e.g. The Problem of Social Cost (1960) the preponderance of transaction costs, the importance of distribution and the implications for economic efficiency. 8 Daniel et al. (2019) propose that carbon prices for this reason should start high and decline over time, inverting the common low-to-high trajectory. Carbon prices could decline as the risk of climate impacts decline, which will happen as emissions are reduced. The availability of new low-carbon technologies increases the opportunities to further reduce emissions. 9 Such as the idea of "mission-oriented innovation" as described in Mazzucato (2013) .
